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I. Introduction
Alexis de Tocqueville was one of the first observers of American society
to note that we are a people prone to organizing ourselves into groups for
religious, political, business, moral, and social reasons.' De Tocqueville
explained that neither society nor laws can compel us to be alike or equal,' and,
as a result, we form small private circles in which we find comfort and
companionship.' This principle is particularly true in the university context,
especially at large public universities where students have formed hundreds of
groups ranging from the American Fisheries Society to table tennis clubs.
4
Academics, administrators, and students generally agree that student
organizations provide an invaluable component of discourse and learning for
both the campus community and for society at large.5 At the same time,
political activism within the academic community has led to increased scrutiny
of many longstanding student organizations at public universities. It is no
surprise that student organizations vigorously engage in campus activism;
however, it is increasingly common that student organizations are the targets of
activism when they resist pressures that try to force them to be fully inclusive of
all segments of society.6 In response to a political attitude at many universities
that all discriminatory behavior-and in some cases even discriminatory
speech-must end, most public universities have implemented nondiscrimination
1. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY iN AMERICA 225 (New York, Colonial Press
1899) (describing American tendency to congregate in groups to achieve goals).
2. See id. ("No state of society or laws can render men so much alike.").
3. See id. ("The Americans, who mingle so readily in their political assemblies and
courts of justice, are wont on the contrary carefully to separate into small distinct circles, in
order to indulge by themselves in the enjoyments of private life.").
4. See, e.g., UB Student Involvement Directory 2002-2003, http://www.student-
affairs.buffalo.edu/directory (last modified Nov. 13,2003) (listing over 500 student associations
at University of Buffalo) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); Registered Student
Organizations, http://utdirect.utexas.edu/dsorg (last updated Aug. 5, 2002) (listing hundreds of
student-led clubs at University of Texas) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); Index
of Student Organizations, http://www.clubs.psu.edu (last updated Sept. 3, 2003) (listing
hundreds of religious, social, and academic organizations at Penn State University) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See, e.g., Mai Tran, On the Law, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 2001, at B2 (describing
importance of student organizations to student development and campus life).
6. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Student Religious Organizations and University Policies
Against Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: Implications of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 21 J.C. & U.L. 369, 369-70 (1994) (describing prototypical case at
University of Illinois involving conflict between student organization and public university
policy prohibiting discrimination based on race, sex, religion, age, and sexual orientation).
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policies.' Many of these universities have required all student organizations to
agree to abide by the nondiscrimination policies as a precondition of
recognition by the university.' Thus far, clashes with university
nondiscrimination policies have occurred when student religious organizations
have denied students leadership positions based on disagreements over core
religious tenets.9 These clashes at public universities have become more
frequent and increasingly contentious,' ° and their legal significance forms the
framework for this Note.
Through their nondiscrimination policies, a number of universities have
derecognized student religious organizations over the past few years." Well-
publicized disputes have occurred at private schools such as Tufts
University,1 2 Middlebury College,' 3 Grinnell College,' 4 and Williams
7. See Lucy Hodges, Alumni Launch P.C. Fightback, TE TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION
SUPPLEMENT, Apr. 21, 1995, at 7 (noting National Alumni Forum's claim that over 300 public
universities have speech codes limiting student speech). In this Note, the term
"nondiscrimination policy" refers to public university policies and regulations that prohibit
student organizations from discriminating, not to public accommodation laws that some states
have enacted.
8. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 369-70.
9. See, e.g., Beth McMurtrie, A Christian Fellowship's Ban on Gay Leaders Splits Two
Campuses, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, May 12, 2000, at A51 (describing recent
instances in which universities have derecognized student religious organizations for failing to
abide by university nondiscrimination policies).
10. See id. (quoting student religious organization's supporter who fears these clashes are
"the beginning of a trend to shut down religious groups that don't adhere to the current
orthodoxy").
11. "Derecognition" describes the university's action that severs the ties between the
group and the university and the resulting status of the then-defunct group. The derecognition
of a student religious organization has a catastrophic and immediate effect on the targeted
group. Derecognition normally prohibits the group from receiving university funding, prevents
it from using the university's name, denies it access to university facilities, and bars it from
advertising on campus. See Victor T. Hu, Note, Nondiscrimination or Secular Orthodoxy?
Religious Freedom and Breach of Contract at Tufts University, 6 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 289,295
(2001) (listing examples of rights and privileges lost when student activity organizations are
derecognized). Derecognition, then, forces the group "underground," to meet off-campus, or to
dissolve. Id.
12. See Andrea Billups, Christian Group Fights Ouster at Tufts over Gay Student Flap,
THE WASH. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2000, at A3 (describing derecognition dispute at Tufts University);
Victory at Tufts, Evangelical Christian Group Regains Recognition, http://www.thefire.org
/issues/tufts05 1600.php3 (last visited Jan. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Victory at Tufts] (same) (on
file with Washington and Lee Law Review); Case Archive, http://www.thefire.org/casearc.php
(last visited Jan. 18, 2004) (listing dozens of colleges and universities that have faced issue) (on
file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See Victory at Tufts, supra note 12 (noting that Middlebury College froze funds for
evangelical student group) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See id. (describing Grinnell College's derecognition of evangelical student group
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 841 (2004)
College.' Additionally, student religious organizations have encountered
difficulty obtaining and maintaining recognition at public universities such as
Ball State University, 16 Rutgers, 17 the University of North Carolina,' 8 the
University of Washington,' 9 the University of Missouri,20 and the University of
Illinois.21 In each case thus far, the university has retreated in response to
public outcry22 and, presumably, constitutional precedent.23 Nevertheless,
public universities continue to threaten student religious organizations with
derecognition, two as recently as December 2002.24 Are universities failing to
learn from the previously unsuccessful showdowns that other universities have
waged against student organizations? Or do the continued challenges reveal a
justifiable mission by universities to expose the seriousness of discrimination?"
because of its religious views).
15. See Cases, http://www.thefire.org/cases.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2004) (listing Ball
State University as site of university encroachment on student religious liberties) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See Case Archive, supra note 12 ("In September 2002, Rutgers University denied the
InterVarsity Multi-Ethnic Christian Fellowship, a student group, the right to take into account
religious beliefs when selecting its leaders.") (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See John Leo, Playing the Bias Card, U.S. NEWS& WORLD REP., Jan. 13,2003, at 41
(describing cases of derecognition of student religious groups at Rutgers, Tufts, and the
University of North Carolina).
18. Id.
19. See Richard M. Paul III & Derek Rose, The Clash Between the First Amendment and
Civil Rights: Public University Nondiscrimination Clauses, 60 Mo. L. REv. 889, 893 (1995)
(discussing initial denial of recognition to Campus Crusade for Christ at University of
Washington). The university finally recognized the organization in the face of a lawsuit. Id.
20. See id. at 894 (stating that student organizations that deny membership on basis of
religious beliefs are denied recognition at University of Missouri).
21. See id. (describing University of Illinois' refusal to recognize Christian Legal Society
because it would not sign statement agreeing not to discriminate on basis of sexual orientation).
After extended negotiation and pressure from the national Christian Legal Society, the
university recognized the organization. Id.
22. See Michael Paulson, Tufts Lifts Its Ban on Christian Group, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
May 17, 2000, at B3 (describing intense public debate on issue and noting that "[m]ore than 150
academics from around the country sent a letter to Tufts protesting the decision to ban the
evangelical student group"); Edward E. Plowman, Brought to "Heel," WORLD MAGAZINE, Jan.
18, 2003, at 9 (noting that outside group threatened suit against University of North Carolina).
23. See Leo, supra note 17, at 41 (stating that the University ofNorth Carolina backed off
derecognition threat "to uphold the principles of freedom of expression"); Paulson, supra note
22 ("At public universities, lawyers say, constitutional protections would clearly protect the
rights of religious groups such as the evangelical students to choose their own leaders and use
student activity fees.").
24. See Leo, supra note 17, at 41 (discussing recent disputes at Rutgers and the University
of North Carolina).
25. Or, perhaps, universities have attempted to appear concerned about discrimination.
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A few university derecognition cases help to illuminate the issue. At the
University of Missouri, a Mormon student organization, which was an
officially recognized organization until the university added homosexuals to
its list of protected groups, refused to promise not to discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation.26 As a result, the university derecognized the group."
At the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (UNC), the administration
threatened to stop funding a Christian organization and ban it from using
campus facilities once the university discovered the group selected its leaders
on the basis of their biblical beliefs and religious devoutness.28 UNC has
since backed away from its threat in order "to uphold the principles of
freedom of expression. 2 9 In perhaps the best known case, Tufts University
derecognized Tufts Christian Fellowship after the group denied a leadership
position to a junior member because of her public decision to embrace a
lesbian lifestyle.30 The university later repealed its decision.3
While there is no record of any litigated cases, this Note examines how a
court hearing such a case should reconcile the group's freedom of
association12 with the university's goal of complete nondiscrimination. 33 This
Note explores the contours of the dilemma a court would face in choosing
between the two values. It also discusses whether the presence of student
religious organizations with self-selected members benefits or harms public
universities. Part II describes the problem and highlights various alternative
solutions. Part III begins by describing the constitutional context into which
student organizations fall and goes on to describe the type of conduct the
Supreme Court has found to be impermissible viewpoint and content-based
discrimination 34 against student religious organizations. Through recent
26. Deborah Haar, SOGA Stands by Policy of Non-Discrimination: Mormons Oppose
Sexual-Orientation Wording, THE MANEATER, Nov. 22, 1994, at 1, 4.
27. Id.
28. Leo, supra note 17, at4l.
29. See id. (quoting president of university).
30. See Paulson, supra note 22 (describing Tufts derecognition case). The Tufts case
provides a good example of the typical derecognition scenario, but, given that it occurred at a
private school, it is technically outside of the scope of this Note.
31. Id.
32. See infra note 36 and accompanying text for constitutional basis and description of
freedom of association.
33. This Note will examine the appropriateness of university derecognition, from both
constitutional and public policy aspects.
34. Viewpoint discrimination is an impermissible subset of content discrimination. See
Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) ("Viewpoint
discrimination is... an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must abstain
from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of
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cases, Part IV explores a private organization's expressive associational right
to choose its own membership and the extent to which nondiscrimination
laws and policies restrict that freedom. Part V explains why student religious
organizations are expressive organizations with broad associational freedoms.
Part V further demonstrates how the constitutional prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination melds with the line of cases that recognize the right of
expressive organizations to self-constitution, leading to the conclusion that a
public university may not use a nondiscrimination policy to restrict a student
religious organization's right to select its membership on the basis of
religious viewpoints. Finally, in light of the tension between freedom and
equality that this Note highlights,35 Part V discusses the public policy
benefits of having a diverse group of student organizations, including student
religious organizations, at a public university.
.Description of the Problem
The most obvious resolutions of the problem of student religious
organization derecognition adopt two extreme positions. First, a court facing
such a situation could decide that the constitutional right to freedom of
association trumps the university's desire to promote total nondiscrimination
on campus. According to this position, because associational rights stem
from the freedoms of speech and assembly found in the First Amendment,36
the great weight of constitutional jurisprudence guaranteeing broad First
Amendment liberties requires that a public university respect an
organization's right to self-constitution. 37 As a result, any state interest in
the speaker is the rationale for the restriction."). Confusingly, the Court is not always consistent
in its usage of the two terms. Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981)
(classifying university's prohibition of all religious speech as content-based discrimination),
with Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (viewing ban of all student religious speech as viewpoint
discrimination).
35. See infra notes 224-26 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between freedom
and equality).
36. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,647-48 (2000) (finding right to
associate with others in First Amendment); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,622
(1984) ("[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by
the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety
of political, social, economic, education, religious, and cultural ends."). Thus, freedom of
association describes not simply a right to congregate together for camaraderie and fellowship,
but the right to congregate for the purpose of expressing particular viewpoints.
37. The law generally regards public universities as "state actors" for constitutional
analysis. See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988)
(White, J., dissenting) (noting well-established principle that public university is state actor and
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eliminating discrimination is not sufficient to overcome the rights of the
religious group.38
The contrary position holds that strict nondiscrimination policies should be
applied to all facets of campus life, even if that means universities must ban
some exclusionary groups from campus, because ensuring nondiscrimination is
a more important objective than protecting a group's right to choose its own
membership.39 According to this view, discriminatory behavior has no place at
public universities, even if conducted not by the university directly, but by a
student religious organization. This position asserts that even if there is a
constitutional presumption in favor of freedom of association, the state, through
its public universities, has a compelling interest in ensuring inclusion that
supersedes unimpeded freedom of association. 40 Moreover, some argue that
student religious organizations should abide by all university regulations if they
wish to accept the university subsidies that usually extend from university
recognition. 1
An intermediate position contends that university nondiscrimination
policies may be beneficial in general, but that universities should give religious
organizations an exemption from the general proscription against
discrimination based on religion and homosexuality. 42 At least one university
public university actions are state actions); see also Paul & Rose, supra note 19, at 896 ("First
Amendment guarantees attach due to the university's status as a state actor."). Therefore,
constitutional limitations on state action also apply to actions taken by public universities. The
question presented in this Note relates to actions by public universities. The application of
"state action" constitutional jurisprudence to actions by private universities is more complex.
For an examination of the issue of derecognition of a student religious organization at a private
university, see generally Hu, supra note II.
38. See Shelley K. Wessels, Note, The Collision ofReligious Exercise and Governmental
Nondiscrimination Policies, 41 STAN L. REV. 1201, 1219 (1989) ("The state's interest in
preventing discrimination should not be permitted to infringe upon religious freedom where the
group looks 'inward' to itself as a religious community.").
39. See Paul & Rose, supra note 19, at 908-09 (noting that protecting all students from
discrimination is compelling state interest overriding groups' associational rights).
40. See id. at 909 (noting dispute among some commentators as to "whether protecting
homosexuals from discrimination is a compelling state interest, and whether forcing student
religious groups to sign nondiscrimination clauses constitutes the suppression of ideas"); cf
Matthew J. Parlow, Note, Revisiting Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Law Center v.
Georgetown University A Decade Later: Free Exercise Challenges and the Nondiscrimination
Laws Protecting Homosexuals, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 219, 238 (2000) (arguing that
homosexual group has right to exist at religiously affiliated private school because of
compelling state interest in preventing all forms of discrimination).
41. See Rosenberger v. Rectors& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23 (1995)
(noting that university's rationale for denying religious group funds was that it did not meet all
university regulations for receipt of funding because it promoted religious beliefs).
42. See, e.g., Justin Giles, Group Might Lose Organization Status: Latter Day Saints
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that refused to recognized a student religious organization later adopted this
middle position.43 Such a policy would recognize the special characteristics of
student religious organizations and protect the groups' freedom of association,
while at the same time furthering nondiscrimination objectives.
While the derecognition of a student religious organization involves the
group's freedom of association generally, it more specifically implicates the
group's freedom of expressive association. The Supreme Court has divided the
concept of freedom of association into two parallel concepts: the freedom of
intimate association and the freedom of expressive association.44 The Court has
defined intimate association as stemming from a right to privacy45 and, thus,
has limited its application to matters involving marriage,46 childbearing, 47 and
child rearing,48 though the concept might also apply to small groups that
function like surrogate families.49 The typical student religious organization
Refuse to Sign Non-discrimination Clause, THE MANEATER, May 3, 1994, at 3 (explaining that
religious groups might receive exceptions, but noting that other nonreligious groups might not
be able to obtain same exceptions); see also infra note 57 (discussing possible exemptions for
student religious organizations).
It is important to note that some student religious organizations may desire to include
students who possess a homosexual orientation but exclude students who engage in homosexual
sexual activities.
43. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 404 (noting action by University of Illinois granting
religious groups exemptions from nondiscrimination policies).
44. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (marking
distinction within concept of freedom of association between intimate association and
expressive association); see also Ann H. Jameson, Note, Roberts v. United States Jaycees:
Discriminatory Membership Policy of a National Organization Held Not Protected by First
Amendment Freedom ofAssociation, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 1055, 1074-75 (1985) (summarizing
Justice Brennan's narrow focus of intimate association in Jaycees with broader overlay of
freedom of expressive association); Shawn M. Larsen, Note, For Blacks Only: The
Associational Freedoms of Private Minority Clubs, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 359, 367-70
(1999) (describing freedom of intimate association as stemming from both free speech and right
to privacy, with freedom of expression arising from full slate of First Amendment freedoms to
advocate, practice religion, petition, and assemble).
45. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965) (finding right to privacy in
penumbra of right to free association in First Amendment).
46. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,384-86 (1978) (associating decision to marry
with intimate association and privacy rights).
47. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (describing child-
bearing decisions as distinctly intimate).
48. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,218 (1972) (describing choice of education for
Amish children as affecting children's integration into faith community).
49. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20 (stating that freedom of association rights are
strongest among those with whom one shares most highly personal aspects of life). Although a
student religious organization might argue that it functions like an extended family for
university students, it is unlikely that a court would evaluate a derecognition case on the
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would likely have a difficult time arguing for constitutional protection under
intimate association precedents.50 Therefore, given the speech-based advocacy
character of student religious organizations, a case involving such a group
probably is analyzed more appropriately under the concept of expressive
association."'
Some have also argued that because freedom of religion might give rise to
a constitutional right to discriminate, 2 the application of nondiscrimination
policies to student religious organizations is improper." However, this Note
does not explore that argument in depth for two reasons. First, the Supreme
Court precedents involving viewpoint discrimination against student religious
organizations never have rested on freedom of religion principles,5 4 so a student
religious organization that is refused recognition is less likely to use a religion-
based defense than a speech-based or association-based defense." Second,
because the Supreme Court has held that religious practices can be outlawed
under generally applicable criminal laws, so long as legislators did not
intentionally design the laws to affect a specific religion,5 6 a free exercise
grounds of intimate association.
50. See Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First
Amendment Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 189, 395
(1999) ("It is unlikely... that a recognized student group could establish a right to intimate
association."); Paul & Rose, supra note 19, at 905-06 (explaining why expressive association
and not intimate association arguments work better for student religious groups trying to avoid
university nondiscrimination policies).
51. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (using expressive
association framework for evaluating Boy Scouts' associational rights); Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (using expressive
association framework for evaluation of constitutional rights of parade group); see also NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding that association's claim of
immunity from state scrutiny of membership list came within scope of constitutional protection
because nonproduction of list was sufficiently related to rights to pursue lawful private interests
and to freely association with others).
52. See generally Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown
Univ., 536 A.2d I (D.C. 1987); Pines v. Tamson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
53. See Battaglia, supra note 50, at 393-94 (noting view of another scholar that
nondiscrimination policies burden free exercise of religion).
54. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995)
(looking to freedom of speech as issue underlying case); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269
(1981) (finding discrimination based on freedoms of speech and association).
55. See Battaglia, supra note 50, at 394-95 (noting that cases of derecognized student
religious organizations are better analyzed under freedom of association rather than freedom of
religion).
56. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
("[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." (internal quotations omitted)).
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challenge to a generally applicable nondiscrimination policy is more difficult to
support.
57
III. Viewpoint and Content Discrimination by the Public University
A. Forum Analysis
The analysis of freedom of association cases often involves classifying the
type of forum in which the restrictions on speech and association occur. The
Supreme Court has identified three forums within which public speech occurs:
the traditional public forum, the designated public forum, and the limited public
forum.58 In the handful of cases in which the Court has considered the
question, it has treated student organizations as existing within either a
designated public forum59 or a limited public forum.60 Either way, when the
Court has found that something less than a traditional public forum exists--that
is, a designated public forum or a limited public forum--the Court has allowed
the governmental entity controlling the forum the latitude to enact some
reasonable "time, place, and manner" restrictions 6' upon access to the forum, so
57. However, at least one aspect of a religion-based argument is nevertheless important.
Many public accommodations laws have explicitly excluded religious organizations from their
coverage. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(), (n) (2002) (excluding religious organizations
from public accommodations laws); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.02(b)(2) (1991) (same). The
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of such exemptions. See Corp. of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)
(determining that it is permissible for public accommodations law to exclude religious groups,
thereby "alleviat[ing] significant governmental interference with the ability of religious
organizations to define and carry out their religious missions"). It is likely that the adoption of
similar exclusions to nondiscrimination policies for student religious organizations might
eventually settle the disputes described in this Note.
58. See Doni Gewirtzman, "Make Your Own Kind of Music": Queer Student Groups and
the First Amendment, 86 CAL. L. REv. 1131, 1141-42 (1998) (describing constitutional
application of three different forum standards to speech); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public
Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1357, 1369-70 (2001)(discussing distinction between
public and nonpublic forums).
59. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183-84 (1972) (using standard similar to
designated public forum standard).
60. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(using limited public forum standard).
61. Courts have used the "time, place, and manner" standard extensively since the 1960s.
See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965) (stating that limited discretion concerning
time, place, duration, or manner of use of public streets may be vested in administrative
officials). While time, place, and manner restrictions may also be used in traditional public
forums as well, id., the emphasis here is that they may be used in the designated public forums
or limited public forums of public universities.
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long as the restrictions are viewpoint neutral.62 Once a public university
establishes a forum for student organizations' speech, the university's status as
a state actor triggers constitutional guarantees against viewpoint and content-
based discrimination by the university.
63
The Supreme Court has frowned upon attempts by public universities to
deny recognition of student organizations based on the organizations'
viewpoint. In Healy v. James,64 the Court found that nonrecognition of a
student organization stifled students' First Amendment rights to speech and
association. 65 The Court rejected the university's claim that because the group
could still congregate off-campus, nonrecognition did not deny freedom of
association; the Court noted that nonrecognition denied the group access to
campus facilities and assets and prevented it from recruiting and advertising on
62. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (concluding
that school's refusal to grant access to limited public forum to club because of club's religious
viewpoint was unconstitutional); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 393 (1993) ("[T]he total ban on using District property for religious purposes could
survive First Amendment challenge only if excluding this category of speech was reasonable and
viewpoint neutral .... We cannot agree [that it is]."); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 684-85 (1992) (permitting viewpoint-neutral restrictions on solicitation of
funds within airport); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983)
(permitting viewpoint-neutral restricted access to public school teachers' mailboxes by teachers'
union because mailboxes are not traditional public forum).
63. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (1995) ("Once it has opened a limited forum,
however, the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set. The State may not
exclude speech if its distinction is not reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum,
nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint." (internal quotations
omitted)); see also Paul & Rose, supra note 19, at 896 ("[O]nce the university has dedicated the
property for speech purposes, First Amendment guarantees attach due to the university's status
as a state actor.").
64. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). In Healy, a group of students who wished to
form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society sued Central Connecticut State
College, claiming that their rights of expressive association had been violated after the college's
president refused to recognize the group. Id. at 177. The university claimed that recognition of
the group would lead to a "disruptive influence" at the school. Id. at 179. The Court rejected a
lower court's ruling that the university had met its burden in blocking recognition of the group.
Id. at 185. The Court noted that intrusions on freedom of association occur not only from
"heavy-handed frontal attacks," but also through subtle acts (such as university nonrecognition
of student organizations). Id. at 183. Because the university had not shown that the group
"posed a substantial threat of material disruption" to the campus, the Court found the
university's basis for nonrecognition to be insufficient. Id. at 189-90; cf Joyner v. Whiting,
477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) (finding that university could not censor student
organization's speech unless there was danger of physical violence arising from it).
65. See id. at 184-85 (concluding that public university had not met its "heavy burden" in
proving legitimate state interest to justify not recognizing student organizations, but remanding
case to determine if alternate, permissible reason for nonrecognition could be found).
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campus. It required that the university bear the burden of justifying
nonrecognition, a "heavy burden" that it could meet only if it could show a
compelling state interest. 67 The Court ruled against the university, concluding
that the university did not demonstrate that nonrecognition reasonably related to
the advancement of a compelling state interest and that no narrower measure
would have accomplished that result.
68
Under Healy, the legal presumption is that a public university should
recognize a student religious organization so long as the group follows the
procedural formalities of recognition and no compelling state interest otherwise
justifies nonrecognition.69 In the context of student religious organizations, the
compelling state interest that a public university most likely would advance is
its interest in protecting students from all forms of discrimination. Under some
circumstances not involving student organizations, courts have found
nondiscrimination to be a compelling state interest permitting the abridgement
of associational rights.7°
A public university, however, would likely have a difficult time showing
that a compelling state interest requires it to force a student religious
organization to admit or elevate to a leadership position a nonadherent or a
practicing homosexual. First, with regard to a nonadherent, federal law bars
discrimination on the basis of religion only in places of "public
66. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 181 (rejecting argument that nonrecognition did little to
disturb freedom of association rights).
67. Id. at 184. The Court also noted:
It may not be sufficient merely to show the existence of a legitimate and substantial
state interest. Where state action designed to regulate prohibitable action also
restricts associational rights-as nonrecognition does-the State must demonstrate
that the action taken is reasonably related to protection of the State's interest and
that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."
Id. at 189 n.20 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
68. See id. (permitting nonrecognition only if it furthered state interest and if no narrower
regulation would further that interest).
69. A recognized student religious organization might not have an automatic right to
receive subsidies from public universities for speech functions, even if the university must
recognize the student group. See id. 182 n.8 ("It is unclear on this record whether recognition
also carries with it a right to seek funds from the school budget .... [I]t appears that, at the
least, recognition only entitles a group to apply for funds .. "); see also Paul & Rose, supra
note 19, at 895 (stating that Supreme Court has held that states may decline to lend funds).
70. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987) (holding that enforcement of antidiscrimination law did not violate expressive
association rights of club members); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,612 (1984)
(reversing lower court's decision that requiring organization to admit women violated members'
constitutional rights).
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accommodation.0' The law might not classify student organizations as places
of "public accommodation" because membership is not open to the general
population, but rather is limited to university students, and because a person
need not be a member of a student organization to be permitted access to
university grounds.7 State statutes forbidding discrimination on the basis of
religion are also unlikely to include student religious organizations within their
scope.73 Second-with regard to a practicing homosexual-while the Court
has recently found a new and tenuous constitutional freedom to engage in
homosexual sodomy, 74 it has never found the protection of homosexuals to be a
compelling state interest.75
B. Viewpoint and Content Discrimination Against Student Religious
Organizations
In addition to the almost-absolute ban on viewpoint discrimination, public
universities generally cannot engage in content-based discrimination against
religious organizations.7 6 The Court ruled in Widmar v. Vincent77 that a
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2000).
72. See, e.g., Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1994)
(stating that organizations are not covered by 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) unless access to public place is
predicated on membership in organization).
73. See, e.g., MuN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.02 (2003) (prohibiting religious discrimination in
employment and business organizations); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 953 (2003) (prohibiting
religious discrimination in housing, employment, and public areas); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5
(2002) (prohibiting discrimination in all organizations not protected by "freedom of association").
74. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (ruling that states
may not outlaw homosexual sodomy because of individuals' personal liberty rights to engage in
private sexual acts).
75. See id. (electing to forbid laws outlawing homosexual sodomy acts on liberty grounds
rather than on grounds that homosexual persons are members of protected class based on their
innate sexual orientation); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660 (2000)
(declining to accept dissent's contention that increased societal acceptance of homosexuality
suffices to mitigate Scouts' expressive rights in other direction); cf High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that homosexuality not
suspect or quasi-suspect class and, thus, decisions based on homosexual discrimination warrant
only rational basis review, not strict scrutiny review). But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,635-
36 (1996) (ruling that Equal Protection Clause forbade state from enacting state constitutional
amendment designed to preclude later legislative, executive, or judicial prohibition of
discrimination based on sexual orientation); Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v.
Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1,33-36 (D.C. 1987) (finding sexual orientation to be suspect class
worthy of strict scrutiny).
76. Cf supra note 34 (discussing overlap between viewpoint discrimination and content-
based discrimination).
77. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, students at the University of
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university may not derecognize a student religious organization by enacting a
policy that discriminates against it based on the content of its speech. 78 Once
the University of Missouri created a forum generally open for student use, it
had to show that its policy excluding all religious speech from the forum served
a compelling state interest. 79 The Widmar Court found that forbidding all
religious speech, while permitting other forms of speech, amounted to
unacceptable content-based discrimination. 0 After finding that allowing
religious speech within university forums did not violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment,8' the Court ruled that the State's desire to
achieve a greater separation of church and state than the Constitution required
was not a compelling state interest that justified discrimination against student
82religious groups.
According to Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of
Virginia,3 a public university may not exercise viewpoint discrimination
Missouri at Kansas City sued the university for denying their First Amendment religion, speech,
and association rights by forbidding a Christian student organization from using campus
facilities. Id. at 266. The university claimed that its mission to provide a secular education as
well as the laws of Missouri prevented it from allowing students to use university buildings for
religious purposes. Id. at 268. The Court found that the university had "discriminated against
student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in
religious worship and discussion." Id. at 269. The Court required that the public university
"show that its regulation [was] necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it [was]
narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id. at 270. The Court decided the university was unable
tojustify its violation of the organization's members' First Amendment rights under applicable
constitutional standards. Id. at 277.
78. See id. at 269 (finding that university discriminated against group's protected speech
and association rights).
79. See id. (finding that no sufficiently constitutional justification permitted state
university to discriminate against religious group that sought to use school facility for religious
worship and discussion).
80. Id. at 269 (noting that university would have to show compelling state interest and
narrowly drawn remedy to justify content-based discrimination).
81. See id. at 271-75 (concluding that access to university facilities passed three-pronged
Lemon test, in that giving access had secular purpose, did not have as primary or principal effect
advancement or inhibition of religion, and did not result in excessive entanglement of
government and religion).
82. Id. at 275-76.
83. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). In
Rosenberger, students taking part in a Christian newspaper at the University of Virginia brought
suit against the university, claiming that the university's refusal to fund the newspaper was
impermissible viewpoint discrimination against the newspaper's religious viewpoint. Id. at 827.
The Court held that the university's policy against funding organizations with religious
viewpoints violated the group's freedom of speech. Id. at 837. The Court said that a state actor
may not engage in "viewpoint discrimination, even when the limited public forum is one of its
own creation." Id. at 829.
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against a student religious organization, even if the university created the forum
it wishes to regulate. 4 In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia refused to
subsidize the printing costs incurred in publishing a student newspaper with a
Christian perspective, despite the school's willingness to pay such costs for all
other student newspapers."5 The Christian newspaper, Wide Awake, met all the
criteria necessary to quality for school funding 86 but, nevertheless, the school's
student council denied the paper funding because it labeled the newspaper a
"religious activity." 7 The Supreme Court found the university's actions to be
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.88
The Court rejected the university's "insupportable assumption that all
debate is bipolar and that antireligious speech is the only response to religious
speech."8 9 By stating this, the Court seemingly acknowledged that speech
counter to a "Christian perspective" comes not only from expressly anti-
Christian publications, which the university did not fund under its policy, but
also from a myriad of other seemingly secular sources that the university policy
supported. Therefore, the Court rejected the argument that viewpoint
discrimination does not occur when a regulation silences multiple views on
religious issues along with the Christian view. Instead, it recognized that the
university supported many other views on those same issues from seemingly
nonreligious sources. 90
The Court refused to distinguish the payment of funds to a student
religious organization in Rosenberger9 from Lamb's Chapel v. Center
84. See id. at 845-46 (reversing lower court decision and requiring public university to
pay costs associated with printing student publication with Christian perspective).
85. See id. at 822-23 (noting that funds were withheld because student newspaper
"primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality").
86. See id. at 825 (explaining that Christian student newspaper had complied with
university regulations that provided reimbursement for student newspapers).
87. See id. at 827 (reporting that student council denied funding based on its belief that
newspaper was religious activity).
88. The Court classified the university's actions as viewpoint discrimination rather than
content-based discrimination because the university did not exclude religion as a subject matter,
but instead disfavored student journalism with a religious viewpoint. Id. at 831. But cf
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (characterizing ban on all religious speech as
being content-based discrimination but, nevertheless, finding such discrimination to be
unconstitutional).
89. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. The Court stated that in this case discriminating
against "an entire class" of religious viewpoints is no more permissible than discriminating
against just one. Id.
90. See id. at 832 (rejecting dissent's position that claims of viewpoint discrimination may
be overcome by showing that all religious speech is unfunded).
91. See id. at 832-33 (discussing university's argument that public universities must have
substantial discretion in allocating scarce monetary resources).
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Moriches Union Free School District,92 in which the Court held that a public
school must make its facilities available on a viewpoint-neutral basis.93 The
Court in Rosenberger stated that a university cannot justify viewpoint
discrimination on the basis of "scarcity" of funds and that the decision in
Lamb's Chapel would have been no different had meeting rooms been scarce in
that case.94 The Court found no controlling difference between using funds to
build and operate a facility and using funds to pay for costs involved in running
a student organization. 95 Finally, the Court found no violation of the
Establishment Clause if the university funded the printing costs of the
newspaper, noting that neutral policies that provide support to diverse, even if
religious, viewpoints preserve neutrality toward religion.96
IV. Freedom ofAssociation and an Organization's Right to Self-
Constitution
While Widmar and Rosenberger indicate that public universities may not
use viewpoint-discriminatory and content-discriminatory policies to encroach
upon a group's speech rights,97 they do not directly settle the issue of whether a
92. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). In
Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that in a nonpublic or limited public forum, control over access
to facilities can be based on subject matter and speaker identity only if such distinctions are
"reasonable and viewpoint neutral." Id. at 392-93. A school district in New York permitted
various community groups to use the school district's facilities but denied a church's request to
show a film strip about parenting from a Christian perspective because the district claimed that
state law forbade it from allowing religious groups from using public school facilities. Id. at
388-89. The Court stated that just because "all religions and all uses for religious purposes are
treated alike ... does not answer the critical question whether [the school district] discriminates
on the basis of viewpoint." Id. at 393. Because the school district permitted the presentation of
all views about child rearing (a subject matter distinction) except those from religious
perspectives (a viewpoint distinction), the Court ruled that the school district had violated the
First Amendment by engaging in viewpoint discrimination. Id.
93. See id. at 393-95 (providing access to school facilities for group wishing to show film
regarding child rearing from Christian perspective because school's denial of access was
improper viewpoint discrimination, as school allowed presentation of all views regarding child
rearing except those from religious standpoint).
94. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995)
(rejecting argument distinguishing access to facilities from access to funds).
95. Id. at 843.
96. See id. at 839 (invoking neutrality standard of Bd. of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch.
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704 (1994)).
97. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981)
("Here [the university] has discriminated against student groups and speakers based on their
desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion.").
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student religious organization's expressive association rights encompass the
right to choose its membership in a manner forbidden by a public university's
nondiscrimination code. Conflicts between private groups' rights to set their
own membership guidelines and nondiscrimination regulations are not a new
problem. Over time, the Court has fluctuated on whether a group's freedom of
association permits it to self-constitute in violation of a nondiscrimination law
or policy.98 The Court's answer has depended upon its assessment of the
amount of damage to the group's freedom of association that would result from
a forced inclusion of unwelcome individuals. 99
A. Pre-Boy Scouts v. Dale
In the years before Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale,'°° the Supreme Court
resolved such conflicts by balancing the private group's right to freedom of
association against the state's interest in prohibiting discrimination.'0 In the
cases that preceded Dale, the Court usually found that the state had a
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination that superseded the private
group's right to self-constitution. 102 In most of the pre-Dale cases, the Court
posed the question in the negative: Does the particular group's right to
98. See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B (illustrating Court's inconsistent decisions in freedom
of association cases).
99. See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B (describing Court's treatment of freedom of association
cases).
100. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (holding that Boy Scouts may
permissibly refuse adult membership to homosexual based on group's freedom of association
despite New Jersey public accommodation statute prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation in places of public accommodation). James Dale, an adult gay man, sued the Boy
Scouts of America for refusing to grant him a leadership position due to his homosexuality,
claiming that New Jersey's public accommodations law forbade the Scouts from discriminating
on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. Id. at 645. Without
actually deciding whether the Scouts are a "public accommodation," the Court ruled in favor of
the Scouts, stating that its freedom of expressive association trumped Dale's right to protection
under the public accommodations law. Id. at 656-59. The Court reasoned that the state interests
in nondiscrimination asserted by Dale did not justify severely intruding upon the Scouts'
freedom of expressive association by forcing the group to admit a homosexual who promoted a
message antithetical to the Scouts' own message. Id. at 648-50.
101. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (weighing the
state's interest in nondiscrimination against the group's interest in freedom of association).
102. See N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1988) (stating
that state interest in eliminating discrimination could outweigh groups' freedom of association);
Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Club Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (stating
state interest in eliminating discrimination outweighed freedom of association); Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628-29 (1984) (same).
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freedom of association give it the freedom not to associate with specific groups
of people despite the state's interest in eradicating discrimination in society?
10 3
An important early case is Roberts v. United States Jaycees.' 4 In Jaycees,
the Court found that requiring a private, business-oriented club'05 to admit
women did not significantly injure the group's associational activities.
0 6
Therefore, the Court concluded that enforcing a Minnesota statute against the
club did not impermissibly restrict the group's freedom of association.' °7 The
Court found that Minnesota had a compelling interest in ensuring
nondiscrimination that outweighed the organization's free association rights.'08
Nevertheless, in an important aside, the Court noted that freedom of association
"presupposes a freedom not to associate. " 1°9
A similar case is Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte. °"0 The most significant aspect of Rotary is that the Court
103. See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 549 (determining that group's freedom of association did not
permit it to shut out women despite their position as unwanted members); Jaycees, 468 U.S. at
628-29 (same).
104. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In Jaycees, the Supreme
Court considered whether Minnesota's Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1982), which
the state claimed required the Jaycees to admit women as full members, violated the Jaycees'
rights to freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 612.
According to the Court, the right to free association is not absolute and a state can justify an
infringement on that right if the state shows a compelling state interest that cannot be met
through less restrictive measures. Id. at 623. The Court ruled that prohibiting gender
discrimination in places of public accommodation (which the Court found the Jaycees to be
because of its business-centered purpose) was a compelling state interest strong enough to
justify the forced inclusion of women. Id. at 625-26. Finally, the Court found that the Jaycees
did not demonstrate that the admittance of women would seriously injure the male members'
freedom of association because of the nature of the group as primarily a business association.
Id. at 626.
105. The Court placed heavy emphasis on its assessment of the Jaycees as a large,
nonselective business group that already permitted women to engage in many aspects of the
organization. Id. at 621.
106. See id. at 628 (finding any incidental abridgment of Jaycees' freedom of association to
be limited and no greater than necessary to further compelling state interest).
107. Id. at 629.
108. See id. (stating that statute permissibly responds to societal problems that state
perceived).
109. Id. at 623.
110. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). In Rotary,
the Court decided that the application of California's public accommodations statute to the
Rotary Club did not unconstitutionally interfere with Rotary Club members' freedom of
association. Id. at 549. The national Rotary Club argued that forced inclusion of women would
violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments' protection of freedom of association. Id. at 540-
41. The local chapter prevailed in its argument that the lack of selectivity and the business-
oriented nature of the Rotary Club militated against constitutional protection of the group from
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began to use a "core belief' test,"' which became centrally important in later
cases such as Dale. "2 The Court used the test to determine whether the forced
inclusion of a person or group of people significantly damaged the group's
freedom of association. This determination was made by assessing whether the
forced inclusion would injure the group's expression of any of its core
beliefs. "3 The Court noted that the inclusion of women did not undermine the
Rotary Club's stance on any of the central issues that the group championed."
4
Therefore, under the Court's jurisprudence at that time, the enforcement of the
statute against the Rotary Club did not effectively trample the group's freedom
of association rights." 15
The Court's dicta in New York State Club Association v. City of New
York," 6 intimated that the right club or group could win a freedom of
association challenge to a nondiscrimination statute or policy." 7 The Court
said the group would have to "show that it is organized for specific expressive
purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoint nearly as
effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share the same sex,
for example, or the same religion." ' Nevertheless, based on the facts in the
immediate case, the Court, applying a balancing test, concluded that the state's
a state statute that required the inclusion of women. Id. at 546-47.
Ill. See id. at 548 (noting that "Rotary clubs do not take positions on 'public questions"'
such that inclusion of women would injure their expression).
112. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) (giving deference to
Scouts' assertion that sentiments on sexual orientation were bona fide belief); id. at 655 (stating
that moral objection to homosexual practice need not be core or founding belief of Scouts for
organization to receive First Amendment protection).
113. See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548 (discussing Rotary's purposes and concluding that group
did not take positions on political issues such that inclusion of women would alter those
purposes).
114. See id. at 549 (expressing belief that inclusion of business and professional women in
business organization would actually increase expressive force of group and not frustrate
group's freedom of association).
115. Id.
116. N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1(1988). In New York State
Club, the Court heard a challenge by a consortium of social clubs to New York City's public
accommodations law that prohibited discriminatory membership practices by large private clubs
that the city deemed "sufficiently 'public."' Id. at 6-8. The consortium argued that the law
infringed the associational rights of members of clubs belonging to the consortium. Id. at 7.
The Court rejected the consortium's challenge, stating that the clubs' regular meal service and
employment of nonmembers made the clubs sufficiently public to fall under the law's
provisions. Id. at 12.
117. See id. at 14 (rejecting argument that city ordinance forbidding discrimination at clubs
with more than four hundred members or clubs that served meals violated freedom of
association).
118. Id. at13.
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interest in advocating nondiscrimination outweighed the group's right to
freedom of association.' 19
The Supreme Court's rulings in Jaycees, Rotary, and New York State Club
might help predict a court's treatment of a derecognized student religious
organization case. Under Jaycees and Rotary, a court could find that a
particular student religious organization has the small size and selectivity
requirements for strong freedom of association protection.120 Alternatively, it
might agree that many student religious groups are affiliates of large national
organizations' 21 or that they do not have strict selection guidelines, 2 both of
which would arguably diminish the constitutional significance of their
expressive activity. New York State Club's dicta suggested that a student
religious organization might successfully avoid derecognition if it could show
that it organized for expressive purposes and that a forced membership
inclusion would severely damage its ability to express its viewpoint.'23 The
counterargument would be that a student religious organization does not
organize for "specific expressive purposes" 24 but, rather, for general fellowship
and camaraderie. Further, one could argue that New York State Club's dicta
applies only to private organizations 125 and that student religious organizations,
as funded entities of a state university, are sufficiently public in nature that
more exacting nondiscrimination rules apply to them.
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of
Boston,126 a unanimous Court held that the application of a public
119. See id. 14-16 (noting that such large organizations are quasi-public and that wider
inclusion of members would not curtail clubs' already limited viewpoint expression on issues).
120. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1983) (describing criteria of
organization as meriting strong associational protections).
121. See Colleen Carroll, Majoring in Religion: The Revival of Belief Among Students
Predates September 11, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 3, 2001, at 19 (noting that Campus Crusade for
Christ has 40,000 student members nationwide at hundreds of schools); McMurtrie, supra note
9 (stating InterVarsity's nationwide membership to be 34,000 students on 560 campuses).
122. See Carroll, supra note 121, at 19 (describing large prayer services in which many
students participate). Of course, as this Note outlines, some student religious organizations do
engage in selective practices based on religious belief and sexual preference.
123. N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).
124. Id.
125. See id. at 8 (explaining that disputed law in case aimed to interfere with private clubs
only to extent necessary to prevent invidious discrimination).
126. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557
(1995). In Hurley, a group of homosexuals brought suit against a veterans group that put on the
annual St. Patrick's Day Parade, claiming that the veterans' refusal to grant a parade spot to the
homosexuals violated a Massachusetts's statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
preference in public places. Id. at 561. The Court concluded that the parade group engaged in
protected expression. Id. at 568-69. Therefore, it had the right to choose the message it
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accommodation law to require a private parade organizer to include marchers
advocating a homosexual message violated the organizer's freedom of
association. 27 The Hurley Court described parades as a form of expression,
and stated that the veterans group that organized the parade was a private
organization that could choose the speech it expressed.' 29 The Court ruled that
it was unconstitutional to force the parade organizer to include a group with a
message antithetical to its own"30 because the group's "participation would
likely be perceived as having resulted from the [organizer's] customary
determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that its message was worthy
of presentation. . . .""' The Court rejected the argument that a compelling
state interest overcame the group's freedom of association right to choose its
own membership.3 2 Further, the Court suggested the state's objective might
have been to "forbid[] acts of discrimination toward certain classes.., to
produce a society free of the corresponding biases.' 33 The Court noted the
potential constitutional infirmities of such a public policy:
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction [would] be used to
produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all
people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a
proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression. The Speech
Clause has no more certain antithesis. 1
34
Based on Hurley, a student religious organization could argue that a
university's insistence that the group include participants with contrary
religious beliefs and sexual preferences amounts to what the Court prohibited
conveyed and those who conveyed that message. Id. at 575-76. Because application of the
nondiscrimination law severely impacted the group's freedom of expressive association, the
Court ruled that the state could not mandate who the parade organizers included in the parade.
Id. at 559.
127. See id. at 566 (holding that parade organizers had freedom of expression right to
choose participants in private parade despite public accommodation laws requiring
nondiscrimination).
128. Id. at 569.
129. See id. at 569-70 (noting that organizers' inclusion of"multifarious voices" in parade
did not forfeit constitutional right to express only speech that organizers advocated).
130. See id. at 576 (noting that "when dissemination of a view contrary to one's own is
forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker's
right to autonomy over the message is compromised").
131. ld. at 575.
132. See id. at 578 (rejecting assertion that compelling state interest overcame principle of
speaker autonomy).
133. Id. at 578.
134. Id. at 579.
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Massachusetts from doing-requiring a group to include participants imparting
a message that the group does not support. In both cases, a governing body
conditions access to a designated or limited public forum on the private
organization's compliance with state-imposed membership rules.'35 If dictating
the composition of a parade's participants impermissibly alters the marchers'
expression,' 36 dictating the membership criteria of a student religious
organization might also impermissibly interfere with that group's expressive
rights. On the other hand, a university might convince a court that the
unwanted person's inclusion would do little to affect the group's speech, on the
theory that an observer of the group would be unlikely to view the unwanted
person's inclusion as having resulted from the "customary determination ...
that [his] message was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as
well."'
37
B. Boy Scouts v. Dale
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court preserved Rotary's "core
purpose test" to determine whether a state nondiscrimination law abridged a
group's freedom of association. 38 Nonetheless, the decision does mark a key
shift in the Court's freedom of association jurisprudence because, for the first
time since Jaycees, the Court refrained from weighing the group's freedom of
association against the asserted state interests. 139 Instead, the Court deferred to
the group's stated principles, finding them to be legitimate core beliefs that they
did not need to prove.' 40 In other words, the Court decided that it was not in a
135. See id. at 559 (describing issue in case as whether Massachusetts could require parade
organizers to include unwanted group in parade).
136. See id. at 576 (stating that forced dissemination of views contrary to one's own robs
speaker of control over his expression).
137. Id. at 575.
138. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,654 (2000) ("Here, we have found that
the Boy Scouts believes that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to
instill in its youth members; it will not 'promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior."' (citations omitted)).
139. See id. at 659 (declining to apply intermediate standard of review and determining that
State's interests did not warrant "such a severe intrusion" into Boy Scouts' freedom of
association); cf Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (holding
that State's interest in assuring women access to leadership skills and business relationships
outweighed Rotary members' right to expressive association); Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1983) (stating that "Minnesota's compelling state interest in eradicating
discrimination ... justifies the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees may have on
the male members' associational freedoms").
140. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 ("[Wle must also give deference to an association's view of
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position to determine the thoughts of people or the beliefs of private groups.
As a result, the Boy Scouts did not have to prove that a primary purpose of its
organization was to speak against homosexuality,' 41 nor did it have to prove
that all or even a large majority of its members agreed with the official Scout
policy.1
42
The Court engaged in a three-step analysis in Dale. First, the Court found
the Scouts' practice of inculcating values in boys to be an "expressive
activity."'143 Second, the Court ruled that the forced inclusion of homosexuals
would significantly injure the Boy Scouts' ability to advocate its viewpoint on
the propriety of homosexuality.' 44 Finally, the Court held that the mandated
inclusion of practicing homosexuals would impermissibly force the Scouts to
speak in favor of a view that it opposed. 45 In short, the Court ruled that the
required inclusion of a gay scoutmaster would significantly and
unconstitutionally interfere with the Scouts' freedom of association.
46
Dale marks an important shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence
surrounding the nexus between freedom of association and nondiscrimination
laws. Before Dale, the Court put the burden on the organization to show that
the nondiscrimination law would significantly encumber the group's
expression. 47 Even if the group demonstrated this, the group then had to
convince the Court that the group's interest in expressive association was so
paramount-and the encumbrance so severe-that it trumped the state's
interest in promoting nondiscrimination.14 In Dale, the Court changed course,
giving deference to the group's claim that inclusion would negatively affect its
expression.1 49 In effect, then, the Court accepted as true the Scouts' assertion
what would impair its expression.").
141. See id. at 655 (stating there is no requirement that Boy Scouts be associated for
purpose of advocating against homosexuality for First Amendment associational freedom to
protect group).
142. See id. (noting that not every member must agree on every issue in order for group's
policy to be "expressive association").
143. See id. at 649-50 (finding Scouts' system of inculcating values expressive activity).
144. See id. at 655-56 (deciding that forced inclusion of homosexual would hurt Scouts'
freedom of expression).
145. Id. at 656.
146. See id. at 659 ("The state interests embodied in New Jersey's public accommodations
law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive
association. That being the case, we hold that the First Amendment prohibits the State from
imposing such a requirement through the application of its public accommodations law.").
147. Supra notes 106 and 114 and accompanying text.
148. Supra notes 106 and 114 and accompanying text.
149. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
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that the law hampered its associational rights simply because the Scouts
claimed the law was burdensome upon its freedom of association. 0 Probably
more important, however, was the Court's retreat from the second prong of the
pre-Dale test. The Court in Dale did not even discuss the balancing test prong
of the pre-Dale approach; instead, in one sentence, the Court succinctly
dismissed the state's interest as too weak to counter the Scouts' associational
freedom. "'
Another important facet of Dale was that the Court did not distinguish
between discrimination based on an unwanted person's status or his advocacy
of a belief outside of the particular organization and discrimination based on his
advocacy of a certain viewpoint within the organization."' The Court
permitted the Boy Scouts to deny membership to Dale, who did not advocate
homosexuality within the context of the Scouts, because he identified himself
as a homosexual' in a visible, non-Scout context. 5 4 As a result, it is likely
that in future conflicts, a court will not distinguish between a group's
discrimination against a person based on his status or extra-organizational
advocacy and its discrimination based on the unwanted person's advocacy of
unwanted views within the context of the organization.
The Dale Court's decision to subordinate New Jersey's nondiscrimination
law to the Scouts' freedom of association possibly anticipates the result of a
case involving the derecognition of a student religious group. Following Dale,
it is possible that a court would accept a Christian organization's contention
that its core beliefs'55 teach that it should follow and profess the principles of
150. It is not clear whether the Court implicitly accepted the Scouts' conclusion that its
freedom of association was burdened, or whether the burden was so obvious as to require little
elaboration. See infra text accompanying note 151 (stating that Court found interest too weak to
interfere with Scouts' expressive association).
15 1. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 659 ("The state interests embodied in New Jersey's public
accommodations law do notjustify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom
of expressive association.").
152. See id. at 654-56 (failing to find controlling that Dale did not disseminate any view
on sexual issues within Boy Scouts, because primary consideration was Dale's sexual
orientation and message his inclusion in organization would send).
153. See id. at 653 (noting that Dale's inclusion would force Scouts to send unwanted
message because of Dale's position as visible gay advocate).
154. Dale led gay marches and appeared in a newspaper photograph and story that
identified him as a homosexual. Id. at 645.
155. As is normally the case in religious disputes, the Court hesitates to attempt to define
what is and what is not a fundamental religious tenet. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215 (1972) (noting that determining "what is a 'religious' belief or practice entitled to
constitutional protection may present a most delicate question"); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (explaining that submitting questions of "truth or verity" of person's
religious beliefs to cases' fact-finders is improper, as "(m]en may believe what they cannot
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Christianity, but not those of other religions or irreligion. The group could
buttress this assumption, of course, by showing that definitive principles have
guided the association's actions and speech in the past. 5 6 As explained below,
however, Dale alone does ensure that a public university cannot derecognize a
student religious organization for engaging in exclusionary membership
practices.
V. Analysis
A. Amalgamating Cases to Resolve the Problem
The confluence of Hurley, Dale, Widmar, and Rosenberger brings into
focus two overarching principles. First, state actors may not engage in
viewpoint discrimination against an expressive group's associational
freedom.'57 Second, associational freedom includes the right to select the
membership composition of the group.' And, under Rosenberger, Healy, and
Widmar, this principle continues to hold true when the state actor is a public
university and the group is a student organization.'59
Once a public university allows student organizations to form on campus,
it has created a designated or limited public forum. 60  Rosenberger and
Widmar show that a public university cannot engage in content or viewpoint
discrimination against a student religious organization's speech because any
prove"); cf United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (holding that courts may
determine whether someone's religious beliefs are sincerely held but may not question whether
beliefs are central to his religion).
156. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 651-52 (outlining history of teachings by Scouts that
homosexuality within Scouts is not appropriate).
157. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995)
(concluding that university's refusal to fund religious newspaper is viewpoint discrimination);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (prohibiting university from barring access to
group based on its religious speech).
158. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) (ruling that group's
expressive associational rights included right to refuse membership to homosexual); Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995) (holding
that parade organizers had freedom of association right to choose participants in parade despite
public accommodations law).
159. See generally Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000)
(involving state actor public university and student organization); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819
(same); Widmar, 454 U.S. 263 (same); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (same).
160. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (describing student organization as existing in
limited public forum). But see Healy, 408 U.S. at 183-84 (using standard similar to designated
public forum standard).
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restrictions on open use of the forum must be content and viewpoint neutral. 16 1
But, these cases dealt with either (a) a recognition policy that was facially
content-biased (and arguably viewpoint-biased) rather than merely
discriminatory in its impact,162 or (b) a student religious organization's pure
speech rather than its expressive association.1
63
Arguably, a student religious group's moral assessment of other religions
and homosexuality is part of the group's speech. Under Widmar, then, a public
university could not abridge that speech through a content-biased policy unless
it showed a compelling state interest to do so. Because asserted compelling
state interests advanced in other nondiscrimination cases' 64 have failed to
outweigh the groups' freedom of association in those cases, a court might
similarly find no compelling state interests in nondiscrimination here.
However, Widmar presented a different fact scenario from those likely
present in a derecognized student organization case. In Widmar, the Court
ruled that the university could not enact a policy that singled out a religious
organization for nonrecognition specifically because of the religious content of
the group's speech. 165 Therefore, while Widmar showed that a university may
not enact a content-biased policy restricting a group's speech, 166 it left open the
question of whether a university nondiscrimination policy that is applied to all
student organizations,167 and that only incidentally affects a student religious
161. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (stating that government may not engage in
viewpoint discrimination "even when the limited public forum is one of its own creation");
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270 (stating that content-based regulations are acceptable only if state
demonstrates regulation is narrowly tailored to serve compelling interest).
162. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30 (viewing university's objection to funding
student organization as viewpoint discrimination); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 (noting
discrimination was against group's "worship and discussion"); cf Employment Div., Dep't of
Natural Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (stating that law permissibly infringed upon
conduct stemming from freedom of religion despite lack of compelling state interest).
163. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981) ("The exclusion ... prohibits the
use of University buildings or grounds 'for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching."').
164. That is, in cases maintaining greater separation of church and state than required by
the United States Constitution. Id.; see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 647 (noting lower court's
assessment that "New Jersey has a compelling interest in eliminating the 'destructive
consequences of discrimination from our society."'). The Court reversed the judgment of the
lower court. Id. at 66 1.
165. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 (noting discrimination against group's "worship and
discussion").
166. Id. at 277.
167. Most universities have designed their nondiscrimination policies to apply to everyone.
As stated in Smith, 494 U.S. at 878, and reiterated in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993), if a state actor designed its policy with the goal of
applying it "only against conduct with a religious motivation," the policy would likely fail.
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organization's ability to obtain recognition, qualifies as the type of content-
discrimination prohibited by Widmar.
On its face, Rosenberger's central theme that a public university may not
discriminate against a religious organization based on the viewpoint of its
speech168 also supports the argument that a public university may not dictate the
membership criteria of a student religious organization simply because it
disagrees with the group's viewpoint of how its membership should be chosen.
This argument presumes, however, that a group's protected speech includes the
right to choose the identity of the group's leaders and participants. This
presumption highlights a potentially significant distinction between the facts of
Rosenberger and a student organization derecognition case. In the former, the
student religious group was engaged in pure speech, 169 which the Constitution
accords the highest protection and to which the Court has applied the forum
analysis consistently, whereas the latter involves freedom of expressive
association, a similar but more tenuous First Amendment freedom. 170 This shift
raises the question of whether the constitutional designated forum doctrine from
the campus group speech cases applies to a campus group's membership
selection process. That is, do the viewpoint- and content-neutrality
requirements for regulations on a campus organization's speech extend to an
organization's right to self-constitution, which is not purely speech but, rather,
expressive association? The following Part explores this question.
B. Freedom of Association Forbids Public University Derecognition of
Student Religious Organizations
As discussed above, if a student organization convinces a court that its
protected speech includes the viewpoint that is expressed by not elevating
nonadherents and practicing homosexuals to leadership positions, then the
student religious organization should easily win a challenge on freedom of
speech grounds against a public university seeking to derecognize the group.
7 1
Even if the group does not convince a court that the selection of its members is
168. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (2000)
(noting state actor may not engage in viewpoint discrimination against group).
169. Id.
170. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing root of freedom of expressive
association as one of enumerated First Amendment freedoms).
171. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 ("Discrimination against speech because of its
message is presumed to be unconstitutional."); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981)
(stating that university may not invoke policy that discriminates against student religious
organizations on basis of viewpoint of speech).
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itself speech, the Supreme Court's decisions in Hurley and Dale show that an
expressive group's freedom of association nonetheless gives it the right to
choose its own membership despite the existence of nondiscrimination
regulations.172 Because freedom of expressive association is not a second-rate
freedom, but rather a means by which the other First Amendment freedoms
may be enjoyed, the self-constitution component of freedom of association
must be given the same constitutional protection that the speech component
receives. 173 In effect, the Supreme Court has stated that an expressive group's
freedom of association includes not only the freedom to speak a particular
message, but also the equally important right to choose who will deliver that
message. 
74
But, are student religious organizations expressive groups? Dale and the
line of cases preceding it"75 lead to the conclusion that student religious
organizations are, in fact, expressive groups. In Jaycees and New York State
Club, the Court established a continuum upon which organizations fall, with
172. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655-56 (2000) (concluding that
because Boys Scouts is expressive group, forced inclusion of homosexual would hamper
group's freedom of association, as "[the presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights
activist in an assistant scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different message from the
presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with the Boy
Scouts' policy" ); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 575-77 (1995) (observing that forced participation of homosexual group in parade
would damage freedom of association of expressive parade group because overall message of
group is distilled from combining each individual's expression).
173. See Thomas 1. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74
YALE L.J. 1, 1-2 (1964) (arguing that Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958) "elevated [the] freedom of association to an independent right, possessing
an equal status with the other rights specifically enumerated in the first amendment").
174. Supra note 172 and accompanying text. This conclusion follows because Dale and
Hurley show that the selection of a group's membership is a coequal component-along with
the actual words of their speech--of the freedom of expressive association. See Dale, 530 U.S.
at 656 (stating that "the Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to send one message
but not another" and stating that inclusion of homosexual would be "sending [a] different
message"); Hurley, 5 1 5 U.S. at 569 ("The protected expression that inheres in a parade is not
limited to its banners and songs, however, for the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken
words as mediums of expression."); id. at 577 (noting that group's overall message is distilled
from what each individual in group expresses).
175. These cases include: Jaycees, Rotary, and New York Club. Because Dale does not
explicitly overrule these cases, aspects of these cases might still carry precedential value in
determining the proper treatment of a derecognized student religious organization. This might
be especially true considering the different character of the discriminating organization in the
Jaycees-Rotary situation (business organizations) and the Dale situation (an expressive
organization). Regardless, the Court's older holdings in the Jaycees-Rotary line of cases do not
disturb the conclusion that public universities cannot derecognize student religious
organizations for choosing their membership under their own criteria.
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the highest constitutional protection of association afforded to families and the
least to unselective business enterprises. 7 6 While not as intimate as families,
most, if not all, student religious organizations assemble, at least in part, for the
expressive purpose of espousing deeply held religious views to each other and
to the campus in general. These groups are often self-selective, emotionally
tight units with a common worldview, and they therefore appear to fit the
standards of an expressive group deserving the strong membership self-
selection rights outlined in New York State Club. 17' Because student religious
organizations congregate for specific expressive purposes and rarely engage in
commercial enterprises, 178 most student religious organizations meet the
Jaycees criteria-small size, selectivity, defined purpose, and clear
policies -79-for strong constitutional protection. The Court has noted that
"constitutional shelter" is proper for such associations because individuals
"draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others." 8
A campus group such as a Christian student organization, then, is an
expressive association that should not have to advocate both pro-Christian and
anti-Christian stances in order to maintain university recognition. So long as it
can show that the forced inclusion of outsiders would frustrate its expression,
the group's freedom of association covers the right to self-select its
membership.' 81 If a university tried to derecognize a Christian organization for
refusing to select a non-Christian as a leader, the organization could contend
that, under Dale, the forced inclusion of the nonbeliever would injure the
group's ability to advocate a Christian viewpoint. 8 2 If the charge against the
176. See N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1987) (describing
aspects of group receiving strong expressive association rights); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1983) (describing range of associational relationship and
strength of constitutional protection afforded each).
177. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing type of group that receives
strong freedom of expression protections).
178. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 626 (emphasizing that discrimination policies by private
groups are especially suspect if they affect business and employment).
179. See id. at 620-21 (noting that Jaycees is large, unselective, and business-oriented
organization).
180. Id. at 619. The rationale of Dale also supports the conclusion that student religious
organizations are expressive groups, by defining an expressive group as one that "engage[s] in
some form of expression, whether it be public or private." Boy Scouts of Am. V. Dale, 530 U.S.
640, 648 (2000).
181. The Court's analysis in Dale suggests that a public university cannot force the student
organization to speak in favor of a value that it does not possess and that forcing the inclusion of
people with contrary values is tantamount to forcing speech against the group's actual beliefs.
See id. at 648 (stating that forced inclusion of unwanted person may infringe group's freedom of
association).
182. See id. at 648 ("The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the
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Christian organization was that it had discriminated against a student based on
his sexual preference, Dale shows that a court should give deference to the
group's assertion that having an openly gay leader would also disrupt its
expressive freedoms.'83
Moreover, Dale obligates a court to respect a group's determination that
forced inclusion would impair its ability to engage in free speech. 184 The Dale
Court noted, "As we give deference to an association's assertions regarding the
nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association's view of
what would impair its expression."' 185  Therefore, a student religious
organization should have little trouble showing that the forced inclusion of
particular students impairs the group's ability to express the values and ideas
that originally caused the members to associate with one another in the first
place. Such an erosion of the control and direction of the organization wreaks
havoc on the student group's freedom of association by diluting the strength of
the members' voices, changing the group's message, and muddying the
organization's purpose. 11
6
Hurley also supports the conclusion that public universities may not
derecognize student religious organizations for failing to follow campus
nondiscrimination policies. Though not normally engaged in parades, student
religious organizations routinely participate in rallies, proselytize, host public
speakers with definitive and controversial points of view, and engage in other
expressive activities intended for public consumption. 87 Thus, the private
citizens who congregate in student religious groups engage in expressive
behaviors that universities frustrate by forcing the groups to express certain
group's freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant
way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.").
183. See id. at 653 ("As we give deference to an association's assertions regarding the
nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association's view of what would
impair its expression."). Dale also indicates that not all current members of the organization
would have to agree on every value for a specific stance to be a "core value" that deserves
constitutional protection. Id. at 655.
184. See id. at 653 (giving deference to group to determine for itself what impairs its
expression).
185. Id.
186. See Meredith R. Miller, Note, Southworth v. Grebe: The Conservative Utilization of
"Negative" First Amendment Rights to Attack Diversity of Thought at Public Universities, 65
BROOK. L. REv. 529, 531 (1999) (discussing damage to vibrant campus debate caused by forced
inclusion of unwanted students).
187. See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the
Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REv. 673, 700 (2002) (noting that Supreme Court doctrine
supports use of public school funds and facilities for use by religious organization).
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beliefs or refrain from expressing other beliefs. 8 ' Because the forced inclusion
of people into a group changes the group's message' 89 and a governmental
entity "may not compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker
disagrees,"' 90 public universities lack the authority to control a student religious
organization's membership.
Dale, Hurley, and Rosenberger also show that student religious
organizations do not lose the freedom to choose their own members by availing
themselves of some state resources. A university might argue that in Dale, the
Boy Scouts was found to be a private organization' 9' and that a derecognized
student religious organization is arguably at least quasi-public because the
state-supported public university partly finances the group. Or, it might argue
that it may regulate the membership requirements of one of its groups because
the student group is financially dependent upon it while Massachusetts did not
188. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 573 (1995) (noting that "all speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to
leave unsaid" and that "one who chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to say"' (citing
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986)). The argument that the
selection of a group's membership is religious conduct that can be prohibited is infirm.
Although the university may cite Smith for the proposition that it may ban the group's
religiously-motivated action through its neutral, generally applicable policy, Smith goes on to
point out that First Amendment protections may bar application of neutral, generally applicable
criminal regulations if, as a defense, a groups implicates freedom of religion "in conjunction
with other constitutional protections such asfreedom of speech and of the press." Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). Student religious organizations
meet that threshold by bundling together the freedoms of speech, association, and religion for
the basis of their right to disobey the nondiscrimination policy. See Leo, supra note 17, at 41
(noting that freedoms of religion, association, and speech are tied together in student religious
organization derecognition cases). While some courts have determined that nondiscrimination
laws are neutral and generally applicable, other courts and scholars have disagreed. E.g.,
compare Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 919 (Cal. 1996) (stating
that nondiscrimination law was neutral and generally applicable), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1128
(1997), and Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 279 (Alaska 1994)
(same), with Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights
Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 393, 426-27
(1994) (arguing that nondiscrimination laws are not neutral, generally applicable laws because
they contain exemptions for some employers, landlords, religious groups, and have other
privacy-based exceptions). Moreover, university nondiscrimination policies are not criminal
and are not laws. Additionally, of course, Hurley and Dale show that generally applicable
public accommodation laws must sometimes yield to a group's freedom of association right to
select its own members.
189. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574-75 (explaining how identity of participants affects
overall message of whole).
190. Id. at 573.
191. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) ("The Boy Scouts is a
private. . . organization.").
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fund the private marchers in Hurley.'92 Of course, the dichotomy between the
Boy Scouts or the marchers and a student religious organization is not sharp.
The Boy Scouts receives a great deal of direct and indirect financial support
from all levels of the government,'93 yet the law does not permit New Jersey to
control the Scouts' membership requirements. 94 Likewise, the veterans group
in Hurley was not susceptible to Massachusetts' desire to force the inclusion of
outsiders despite the fact that tax dollars partially underwrote the parade and it
used government-owned roads and sidewalks. 95 Further, in Rosenberger, the
Court concluded that a student group, which used university-owned buildings
and funding, nevertheless engaged in private, not public, speech.' 1
96
One final case also supports the premise that a public university must
recognize unpopular student religious organizations. In Board of Regents of
the University of Wisconsin v. Southworth,19 7 the Court decided the legality of
the fee public universities charge to fund their campus groups.'98 While the
Court concluded that the university's goal of facilitating "the free and open
exchange of ideas by, and among, its students"'199 justified charging students a
mandatory student activity fee,2 °° the decision also required that the university
192. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572 (describing parade organizers as "private" group).
193. See Barbara Dority, The Bigoted Scouts ofAmerica, THE HUMANST, July-Aug. 1998,
at 35 (noting that government employees provide educational services to Scouts and local
governments and police departments sponsor troops); Stuart Taylor Jr., Boy Scouts vs. Gays:
The System is Working Just Fine, 32 NAT'L J. 2769 (2000) (noting Boy Scouts' use of federal
land and sponsorship by schools and governments). But see Joe Laconte, The Boy Scouts'Day
in Court, WKLY. STANDARD, May 1,2000, at 30, 31 (stating that Scouting organizations take in
no actual funding from governments).
194. See Dority, supra note 193, at 35 (noting government funding of Scouts); Taylor,
supra note 193, at 2769 (same).
195. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 561 (1995) ("Through 1992, the city allowed the Council to use the city's official seal, and
provided printing services as well as direct funding.").
196. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834-35 (1995).
197. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). In Southworth,
students at the University of Wisconsin challenged the constitutionality of a university program
that charged each student a fee to fund organizations engaged in political and ideological speech
that they found offensive, Id. The students charged that their First Amendment freedom of
speech included the right not to speak. Id. at 227. The Court ultimately concluded that a
mandatory student activity fee is permissible because of the university's interest in maintaining
a dynamic campus dialogue. Id. at 223. It held, however, that the university's program was
unconstitutional because it was not administered in a viewpoint-neutral manner. Id. at 221.
198. See id. at 221 (determining that public universities may charge all students student
activity fees so long as they fund student speech in viewpoint-neutral manner).
199. Id. at 229.
200. See id. at 221 (upholding constitutionality of mandatory fee if properly administered).
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ensure that student activity funds are available to diverse student groups,
including religious ones,201 in a viewpoint-neutral manner.20 2
Southworth protects religious expression on campus by implicitly
approving the practice of passing students' dollars through an arm of the state
and back to quasi-private extracurricular student organizations.20 3 It also
suggests that a public university must impartially fund organizations if it wants
to charge an activity fee. 204 A student religious organization that the university
refuses to recognize could argue that the university has not comported with
Southworth because, when nonrecognition or derecognition occurs, the
university has based its funding decision on the group's viewpoint on religion
and homosexuality. Once a public university stops funding student religious
organizations (under a claim that they have violated the university's
nondiscrimination policy), the university has violated the spirit of
Southworth,20 5 by continuing to charge students the fee, yet failing to fund a
wide range of organizations on a viewpoint-neutral basis.
Finally, it warrants noting that attacks on student religious organizations
have not been based on state or federal law, but on independent university
policy. 20 6 It is unlikely that a court would find that a university policy trumps
the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expressive association.
Constitutional protections of freedom of association carry more weight vis-A-vis
administrative policies than they would against legislatively-enacted laws,
because public universities are not a coequal legislative branch of
20government. 07 Because Massachusetts and New Jersey failed to show
201. See id. at 233 (naming "philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political" as
areas of discussion that are to be funded in viewpoint-neutral manner).
202. See id. (analyzing case in terms of viewpoint neutrality). Instead of the viewpoint-
biased approach that the university had been using, the Court mandated a system that funded
minority views, which would necessarily include those of unpopular religious groups, in a
viewpoint-neutral way. See id. at 235 (determining majority-rule system as inimical to
viewpoint neutrality).
203. See id. at 221 (holding student activity fee design constitutional).
204. See id. at 233 (permitting mandatory activity fee if used to fund diverse groups in
viewpoint-neutral manner).
205. The Court permitted an intrusion on the students' rights not to speak only so long as
the fee funded a wide range of student organizations in a viewpoint neutral manner. See id. at
233-35 (requiring viewpoint-neutral funding of diverse group of organizations).
206. See supra notes 12, 17, and 19 and accompanying text (noting that universities have
derecognized student religious organizations for violating university policies).
207. As compared to a state law, a university policy that abridges students' constitutional
freedoms (such as a nondiscrimination policy that abridges students' freedom of association)
receives less deference when challenged by a constitutional freedom. Cf. Regents of the
University ofCalifornia. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309-10 (1978), in which Justice Powell, in his
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compelling interests in nondiscrimination through their legislatively-enacted
laws,208 it is even more remote that a university could show that its mere policy
goals constitute a compelling state interest in the face of an expressive
organization's associational freedoms.209
C. Public Policy Considerations Also Preclude the Derecognition of
Student Religious Organizations
What public policy benefits come from having student religious
organizations at public universities? Like all people, students have a
fundamental need for belonging and community involvement.210 While
organizations in general help to satisfy this need, student organizations serve an
especially important function for young adults away from home who seek to
connect with groups of people with familiar values and beliefs. 21 1 When
students leave their families for their new lives at school, they often want to re-
establish the sense of community that they enjoyed while at home.21 2 Religious
plurality opinion, stated that one of the many reasons the University of California's affirmative
action policy was invalid was that the university, whose proper role is "education," adopted it,
rather than the state legislature, whose mission includes making policy decisions. "[I]solated
segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to make [legislative policy], at
least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria." Id. at 309. As
a result, the policy did not withstand constitutional assault as well as a law passed by a
governmental body responding to identified discrimination. Id. at 309-10.
208. See supra notes 126-34 and 138-51 and accompanying text (discussing
nondiscrimination laws as basis for Hurley and Dale cases).
209. See Norman J. Fry, Note, Lamprecht v. FCC: A Looking-Glass into the Future of
Affirmative Action, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1895, 1917-18 (1993) (noting that constitutionality
of regulations qua laws and regulations qua policies sometimes depend upon group that
establishes regulation, with higher probability for constitutionality for legislatively-enacted laws
than administratively-enacted policies); see also Stephen M. Rich, Note, Ruling by Numbers:
Political Restructuring and the Reconsideration of Democratic Commitments After Romer v.
Evans, 109 YALE L.J. 587, 607 n.104 (1999) ("Formalists... tend to grant less discretion to
decisions made by governmental institutions that are neither representative in nature nor
maintain some direct connection to the electorate."). Public universities are such governmental
institutions.
210. ELLIOTT McGINNIES, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 179 (1970).
211. Cf Christian Chadd Taylor & R. David Donoghue, BriefAmicus Curiae of the Black
Law Students 'Alliance in Support of Defendant-Appellants, 8 MICH. J. GENDER& L. 105, 107
(2002) (explaining how black student organization fosters community among African-American
students and eases transition from home life to academic community).
212. For many people, religious belief and church life are a central aspect of their sense of
community. See George W. Dent Jr., Secularism and the Supreme Court, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1,
38 (discussing how religion plays large role in developing "sense of community"); William P.
Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clause, 43 DEPAuL L. REv. 243, 245 (1994) (stating that
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groups provide some students with that basis for personal and community
identity. '3
Proponents of the existence of groups selected by sex, race, or religion on
campus believe that, while discrimination may play an evil role in the larger life
of the nation, the existence of select social groups at universities does little to
engrain discriminatory beliefs into students' minds.21 4 Students widely interact
with different groups of people in the classroom, dormitories, and dining room,
they argue, so occasional exposure to small exclusive groups does not breed a
segregated campus community.215 They also point out that while adherents to
fervent religious beliefs may be majorities in some American communities, that
is often not the case at large public universities where left-leaning thought is
commonplace and only a small minority of students hold traditional religious
beliefs. 216 These groups encourage students to discuss viewpoints and issues
with a core group of people who face the same problems and challenges from
the same point of view, thereby building a sense of security and camaraderie. 1 7
Proponents argue that the inclusion of outsiders would prevent the group's
members from speaking openly about their problems and reaching beneficial
solutions.
Others, however, believe that exclusive student religious organizations
perpetuate discriminatory attitudes and engender intolerance in impressionable
young adults. These people argue that universities shape the moral fabric of the
emerging generation and instill in students the mores that they pass on to
society in general.218 If universities allow groups to discriminate, those
religion "imbues a sense of community obligation and virtue into the mind of the citizen-
believer that is necessary to maintain a system of self-government").
213. See Karen T. White, Note, The Court-Created Conflict of the First Amendment:
Marginalizing Religion and Undermining the Law, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 210 (1994)
(describing how marginalizing religion injures personal and group identity).
214. See, e.g., 1. Lucretia Hollingsworth, Note, Sex Discrimination in Private Clubs, 29
HASTINGS L.J. 417, 434-37 (1977) (noting that Congress found no good reason to prohibit
discrimination in private social organizations); Note, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs:
Freedom ofAssociation and Right to Privacy, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1181-82 (1970) (stating
that private clubs are generally exempted from federal nondiscrimination law).
215. See Steven M. Colloton, Comment, Freedom ofAssociation: The Attack on Single-
Sex College Social Organizations, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 426, 442 (1986) (noting positive
aspects of many college groups).
216. See White, supra note 213, at 210 (arguing that traditional religious groups can
provide sense of community even if dominant culture values individualism and relativism).
217. See 120 CONG. REc. 39,992 (1974) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating that social
organizations provide source of stability to college students).
218. See, e.g., Frank v. Ivy Club, 548 A.2d 1142, 1148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)
(finding that permitting discrimination at university causes negative beliefs to be transmitted to
society), rev'd on other grounds, 576 A.2d 241 (N.J. 1990).
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excluded may be permanently handicapped by receiving fewer political and
social advantages.' 9 Supporters of nondiscrimination regulations argue that
the policies protect historically disadvantaged groups from the barriers erected
by others.220 They argue that everyone suffers when society prevents large
segments of the population from contributing to the group because it stifles the
outsiders' talents. 221 Further, these proponents argue that the artificial division
of people fosters stereotypes about what goals, abilities, and interests certain
types of people hold.2 2 Finally, they argue that university policies do not
actually restrict the way that these religious groups practice their faith.223
The collision of nondiscrimination policies and associational freedoms
illustrates what Lawrence Tribe has called "the ancient paradox of
liberalism. '22 4  Freedom inherently conflicts with equality.22 5  While
219. See Michael M. Bums, The Exclusion of Women from Influential Men's Clubs: The
Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 321, 328 (1983)
(arguing that membership in right organizations, even early in life, can develop connections for
social and professional success and community leadership).
220. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624-26 (1983) (championing
removal of "barriers to economic advancement and political and social integration that have
historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups"). Opponents argue that when people
originally founded exclusive groups, they barred members of other religious groups and sexual
orientations in order to entrench the bigotry they sponsored. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig,
Fidelity in Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1428 (1997) (discussing perpetuation of
bigoted attitudes by claiming "tradition"). But see Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The
Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303, 325-26 (1986) (stating that formation
of insular religious groups first began in America for protection). Members today justify the
continued discrimination, opponents argue, by claiming that tradition mandates continuing the
practice. See, e.g., Lessig, supra, at 1428 ("Unless we have a tradition of ignoring tradition...
'tradition' as a reason should be a non sequitur in equal protection arguments.").
221. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 625 (noting that discrimination based on "archaic'and
overbroad assumptions" denies people chances to contribute to society).
222. Id. In reality, they contend, people of different religions often share many beliefs,
such as the preservation of the family unit, the promotion of social justice, and the dignity of all
people. See Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech That is Both Religious and Political, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 793, 808 (1996) (noting expression of similar values in different religions and in
secular thought); Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the
Universality of International Human Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 527, 558 (2001)
(noting similar emphasis on natural law, divine law, and human rights in Christianity, Judaism,
Islam and Asian religions).
223. See Battaglia, supra note 50, at 394 (stating that student groups are probably not
religious organizations for purposes of the ministerial exemption); McMurtrie, supra note 9
(contending that some believe nondiscrimination policies do not "involve[] the way in which the
groups practice their faiths").
224. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-18, at 974 (1978)
(discussing conflict between freedom and equality).
225. See David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the
Right of Association, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 203, 243 ("As anyone who has had a dinner party
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contemporary constitutional jurisprudence views eliminating discrimination as
an important goal, constitutional protections of associational rights are also
clearly important.2 26 Thus, permitting student religious groups to engage in
self-constitution furthers several important societal goals.
The existence of student religious groups with policies and methodologies
that differ from the university's "official" viewpoint leads to the furtherance of
democracy. While a single student is unlikely to contribute significantly to the
political process on a large campus, joining with others to engage in a common
mission helps to ensure that other students, faculty, and administrators on
227campus will hear and take into consideration the unorthodox viewpoints.
The forced inclusion of dissonant voices in the group dilutes the group's
message and weakens the group's force.228 Commonality, on the other hand,
produces solidarity,229 ensures that only those who will effectively
communicate the group's viewpoint are included, and makes the group and its
purpose more identifiable to others.230
A student religious group that does not agree with a politically correct,
campus-wide nondiscrimination policy communicates to observers its
disagreement with the university's official policy, thereby contributing to the
ideal of self-government.2 1' The protection of associational freedoms serves "as
a buffer against all-powerful central authority" and preserves the private sphere
in the person rather than in the government.232 The group's members are able
knows, the act of association is an act of discrimination .... The right of association would
mean little if the right to choose one's associates could be overridden every time the state
decides that a set of criteria are discriminatory.").
226. See id. (noting difficulties of balancing nondiscrimination laws with freedom of
association).
227. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on
Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 686, 713
n. 149 (1991) (noting greater political power exhibited by minority groups when they congregate
for specific political purposes because of their "discreteness and insularity").
228. See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of
Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391, 434 (1987) ("[A]ny addition to the group
would threaten its expressive freedom as well, because changes in membership would be highly
likely to alter both the content and the mode of expression.").
229. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713,725 (1985).
230. See id. at 730-31 (explaining that discrete groups are more likely to have common
voice than blended groups).
231. See Eileen Finan, Note, The Fact-Opinion Determination in Defamation, 88 CoLuM.
L. REv. 809, 834 (1988) (discussing criticism of public officials and policies as essential
component of self-government).
232. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-16, at 1297 (2d ed.
1988) (using associational freedom as element of self-realization and means of preventing
government trampling of freedoms). Professor Tribe has argued that breaking down
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to create a realm in which the governing university dogma does not control
their attitudes and beliefs, much in the way that First Amendment rights ensure
that extra-governmental perspectives can be legally disseminated.233 The
unrestricted expression of a student religious group's sentiments contributes to
the political process by informing the public of the variety of viewpoints that
exist on religion and sexual morality.3 4  This lack of restriction permits
observers to critically evaluate the efficacy of the organization's viewpoints on
these issues and to re-examine their own beliefs, which, in turn, may lead to a
change in the university's policy if enough observers agree with the student
religious group's position.235
The existence of diverse, robust, and uninfiltrated student groups is critical
to ensuring vibrant campus debate.236 Some groups will emerge that advocate a
change from the campus status quo on given issues, while others, in turn, will
champion the current policies as worthy of continued support.237 Without
protection of each group's associational rights, a Zionist group is not insulated
from the demands of a neo-Nazi to be made a leader, an atheist group cannot
ensure that fundamentalist Christians will not infiltrate it, and a small Hindu
group cannot protect itself from "take over" by a larger group of Muslims.
Viewpoint pluralism "allows the development and advancement of diverse
perspectives and thereby enhances the national debate. ' 23' The existence of a
variety of viewpoints on societal conditions nurtures minority perspectives of
discriminatory groups so that society's members may be free from domination "destroys the
only buffer between the individual and the state, and risks enslaving the individual to the state's
potential tyranny." TRIBE, supra note 224, at 898.
233. See Kimberly A. Dietal, Shadow on the Spotlight: The Right to Newsgather Versus
the Right to Privacy, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 131, 134-35 (1999) (noting that historical purpose
of First Amendment rights was to protect against proscription of government criticism in order
to further self-government).
234. See Carrie Miller, Comment, Recent Development: Abortion, Protest, and
Constitutional Protection-Bering v. Shaw, 62 WASH. L. REv. 311,311-12 (1987) (stating that
the First Amendment "embraces essential constitutional values, including one that posits a
'market place of ideas,' where the truth of an idea is tested by its acceptance or rejection after
public debate").
235. See id. at 312 (arguing that wide variety of viewpoints informs electorate).
236. See Monte Arthur Mills, Note, The Student, the First Amendment, and the Mandatory
Fee, 85 IowA L. REv. 387, 392 (1999) (noting that diverse student groups expose students to
diverse viewpoints).
237. See Carolyn Wiggins, A Funny Thing Happens When You Pay for a Forum:
Mandatory Student Fees To Support Political Speech at Public Universities, 103 YALE L. REV.
2009, 2036 (1994) ("Campus debate often takes the form of opposition between groups that
oppose the status quo and are therefore 'political,' and those that support the status quo .... ).
238. William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right ofAssociation, 81 Nw. U. L. REv.
66, 88 (1986).
878
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION BY PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 879
solutions to university problems and societal issues in general.23 9 This
existence guarantees that issues are not viewed through a single lens chosen by
the public university's administration, but, instead, are evaluated by groups of
people who do not all share an identical set of values, morals, and ideals.
2 40
Hurley indicated that the appropriate use of nondiscriminatory statutes and
policies in the realm of expressive speech is very narrow. 241 Using such
regulations for the broader purpose of correcting perceived societal beliefs is
misplaced legislative activism. The Court noted that nondiscrimination rules
are not proper if used as a means to "produce a society free of... biases 242 or
for mandating speech "neutral toward the particular classes." 243 Therefore, it is
inappropriate for a public university, as an arm of the state, to enact
nondiscrimination policies as a means of cleansing the biased minds of
religious students in order to produce orthodox believers of the university's
ethos. If such aims pervade a university's motivation of nondiscrimination
policies, diversity of skin tone, sexuality, gender, and age are encouraged, but
diversity of thought surely is not.2"
The efforts by the "intelligent left '245 to purge religious expression from
campuses highlight how many public universities' campaigns for political
correctness have run aground: Attempts to rid campuses of discriminatory
groups in order to promote diversity and tolerance ironically have had the
opposite effect. Rather than increasing diversity on campus, the elimination of
religious groups has resulted in a narrowing of the bandwidth of ideas and
239. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1971) ("Majority tyranny occurs if legislation invades the areas properly left to
individual freedom.").
240. The political motivations that lead to the derecognition of religious groups also rob
students of the chance to learn about the beliefs of different religions. One university chaplain
has said, "I'm more concerned about educating the student body as to why religious
organizations are unique," than concentrating on calling deeply held religious beliefs "bigotry."
See McMurtrie, supra note 9 (quoting Laurel M. Jordan, Middlebury College chaplain).
241. The Court noted that Massachusetts designed its nondiscrimination code to prevent
denial of access to public accommodations. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual
Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 578 (1995) (analogizing nondiscrimination statutes'
purpose with common law rule ensuring access to all at roadside inns).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 579.
244. See McMurtrie, supra note 9 ("[Universities are] saying, 'As long as you look
different and have different sexual orientations, that is diversity. But you must all think alike."'
(quoting David A. French, Cornell Law School lecturer)).
245. See Nicholas D. Kristof, The Left Dumbs Down, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 2002, at A27
(naming elite intelligentsia and its liberal beliefs as "intelligent left").
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thoughts allowed on campus. 246 The university essentially silences those
groups that diverge too drastically from its diversity-at-all-costs orthodoxy.
This discrimination by the university in turn demonstrates that it is tolerant of
diverse beliefs only so far as such beliefs reasonably agree with its own."'
Universities should not decide which religious beliefs are good and which
are bad. Students' theology stems not from prejudice or bigotry, but from
legitimate religious beliefs which universities should protect.248 Along the
same lines, universities also should not determine what a particular religion
teaches about a particular issue; for example, a university should not determine
whether biblical Christianity in fact condemns homosexual orientation or
homosexual relationships as immoral. As such, religious organizations should
not be forced to embrace contrary religious beliefs based on an outsider's
assessment that their beliefs could or should accommodate alternative
viewpoints.
Allowing student religious organizations to set their own membership and
leadership policies also permits members of the group to gain self-identity.
Hannah Arendt has explained that unfettered speech is eminently central to
self-realization because it is the means by which individuals determine the
substance of their own thoughts.249 Just as an association of gays and lesbians
at a public university might play an important role in the exploration and
development of a homosexual's identity,250 religious associations composed of
believers of the same faith allow religious students to develop their own
individual identity.
25'
246. See Miller, supra note 186, at 531 ("Without sufficient funding, the student
organizations which foster the 'diverse debate' that is critical to the university's educational
mission will largely cease to exist, leaving only a more uniform and colorless educational
institution.").
247. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 139-40 (1986) (arguing that
protecting both tolerant and intolerant speech is important First Amendment goal).
248. See STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR Mix: RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 188-89 (1996) (arguing that long-held religious tradition
and sincere religious beliefs mandate accommodating some discrimination based on religion,
gender, and sexual orientation for religious organizations).
249. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 24-26 (1958) (describing how Greeks
believed thought and identity came from speech and action).
250. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGEJR.,GAYLAW 181 (1999) (explaining that interaction among
gays and lesbians helps individuals come to self-realization).
251. Finding others who agree on important issues such as ultimate destiny and the
existence of God empowers individuals to further understand themselves. See David B.
Salmons, Note, Toward a Fuller Understanding of Religious Exercise: Recognizing the
Identity-Generative and Expressive Nature of Religious Devotion, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1243,
1244-45 (1995) (stating that religious beliefs play an essential role "in defining and, more
importantly, expressing individual and group conceptions of identity"). Permitting individuals
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION BY PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 881
Consistency and good sense also prohibit public universities from
derecognizing student religious groups. First, just as university fraternities
and sororities exist for the purpose of joining together people of the same
sex, the raison d'gtre for religious groups is uniting people of the same
religion around their common religious beliefs.25 To decree that the group
formed around Judaism or evangelicalism must uphold all other religious
beliefs as equal or expedient is absurd. Second, while public universities
have been quick to derecognize some student religious groups for
discriminating on the basis of religion or sexual preference," 3 the same
universities have not derecognized men's glee clubs2 4 or women's intramural
rugby teams for discriminating on the basis of sex255 and have not
derecognized nonevangelical religious groups for discriminating on the basis
of religion or sex.256 Such disparate treatment of groups, all of which violate
some component of the archetypical nondiscrimination policy, raises
questions about the real motivation for derecognizing conservative student
religious groups.
25 7
to voice their beliefs and opinions in organizations composed of like-minded individuals creates
a climate in which individuals are more personally and socially fulfilled. See Lillian R. BeVier,
The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of
Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 318 (1977) ("It seems reasonable to assume that a society in
which citizens voice their beliefs and opinions on a wide range of issues is more likely to be a
society in which individuals are in fact able to fulfill themselves.").
252. See Dent, supra note 212, at 38 (discussing sense of community as an outgrowth of
religious organizations).
253. See supra notes 9-31 and accompanying text (describing cases of student religious
organizations' derecognitions).
254. See, e.g., Varsity Men's Glee Club, http://www.thedesignworkshop.net
/ChoralMusic/MensGlee/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2004) (listing UNC's men's glee club as
recognized student organization) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
255. See, e.g., Women's Rugby at the University of Washington, http://students.
washington.edu/wrugbyfc (last updated Jan. 6, 2004) (listing women's rugby club at University
of Washington as recognized student organization) (on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review).
256, See, e.g., Catholic Center at Rutgers, http://www.catholic-center.rutgers.edu (last
visited Jan. 18, 2004) (giving information about on-campus Roman Catholic Eucharist, which is
celebrated exclusively by male priests and is to be received only by Catholics) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also McMurtrie, supra note 9 (stating that "the question
for Tufts and other institutions is whether they apply their nondiscrimination policies
consistently and fairly").
257. See Leo, supra note 17, at 41 ("'Political and religious affiliation' is not really the
sticking point at [the universities] .... The real intention is to break or banish religious groups
with biblically based opposition to homosexuality.").
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VI. Conclusion
Although the Court has not yet heard a case in which a public university
has derecognized a student religious organization, its jurisprudence on several
other closely related cases shows that a public university may not use its
nondiscrimination policy to derecognize a student religious organization that
chooses its members based on its religious beliefs. The Court has repeatedly
held that public universities may not engage in viewpoint discrimination against
student religious organizations based on the group's religious viewpoints.
Student religious organizations are expressive organizations with broad
associational freedoms to select their own membership. Together, these
principles demonstrate that the Constitution does not permit public universities
to refuse to recognize religious organizations that diverge from the campus
orthodoxy. Further, this result ensures that a broad array of student
organizations, including religious ones with politically unpopular viewpoints,
continue to serve the important role of maintaining the vitality of diverse
thought and robust debate at public universities.
